RAS Social ScienceGosudarstvo i pravo

  • ISSN (Print) 1026-9452
  • ISSN (Online)2713-0398

Typology of legal theories: positivist tradition and challenges of interpretativism

PII
S102694520013149-4-
DOI
10.31857/S102694520013149-4
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Volume/ Edition
Volume / Issue 4
Pages
70-80
Abstract

This article examines classical methodological dimensions / typologies of legal theories, centered in modern Anglo-American jurisprudence, and analyzes their determination and use in legal positivism and in R. Dworkin’s interpretative doctrine. The article aims to explicate basic methodological characteristics of legal theories within Anglo-American positivist tradition (including H.L.A. Hart’s views) as well as to consider these characteristics in light of the ideas and challenges of interpretativism revealing identification and consequences of R. Dworkin’s account. As general conclusions the article substantiates a status of R. Dworkin’s interpretative doctrine as a hermeneutical jurisprudence of “internal point of view”, a particular legal theory of a normative character. Its role is emphasized not only as a methodological alternative to positivist and other similar conceptions within a framework of classical system of dimensions of legal theorizing, but also as a challenge to this system itself, to its criteria and a row of methodological possibilities — a project of a general descriptive morally-neutral jurisprudence. Finally, the influence of R. Dworkin’s interpretativism on modern Anglo-American legal thought is stated, which encourages transformation of its “intellectual landscape” toward a more advanced jurisprudential methodology, able to allow for more subtle and complex challenges.

Keywords
types of legal theories, legal positivism, legal interpretativism, hermeneutical legal theory, R. Dworkin, legal interpretation, methodology of jurisprudence
Date of publication
29.04.2021
Number of purchasers
22
Views
1943

References

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