Везде
INCENTIVES IN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (EXPERIENCE OF SOVIET UNION, CHINA AND RUSSIA)
Table of contents
Annotation Estimate Publication content
References Comments
Share
QR
Metrics
INCENTIVES IN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (EXPERIENCE OF SOVIET UNION, CHINA AND RUSSIA)
Annotation
PII
S086904990000616-9-
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Andrei Yakovlev 
Edition
Issue 2
Pages
5-19
Abstract
Under President Putin and especially after 2003 Russia started to move to some model of state capitalism characterized by very limited political competition, weak NGO sector and independent mass media as well as absence of independent courts. As a result since mid 2000s Russian model of governance from formal point of view became much closer to Chinese one (especially taking into account trends to centralization of fi scal revenues and development of redistribution policy in China since late 1990s). One of expected outcomes for both countries is connected with high level of corruption which is typical for state capitalism models. Nevertheless even after global fi nancial crisis 2008–2009 China could support high economic growth but Russia clearly failed to meet this challenge. We assume that these differences can be explained by the design of incentive system in public administration in both countries. We consider previous theories (including fi scal federalism under political centralization, U-form vs. M-form of governance structure etc.) and propose new one based on analysis of composition of executive and control functions at different levels in administrative hierarchy in China in Russia as well as in the USSR.
Keywords
economic development, control authority, excessive regulation, incentives in hierarchy, economic systems
Date of publication
05.03.2015
Number of purchasers
1
Views
922
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
Previous versions
S086904990000616-9-1 Дата внесения правок в статью - 05.11.2020
Cite   Download pdf

References



Additional sources and materials

Zal'tsman I., Ehdel'gauz G. (1984) Vspominaya uroki Tankograda // Kommunist, 1984, №16, s. 76–87.
 Izborskij Klub (2013) Strategiya “Bol'shogo ryvka”// Izborskij Klub. Yanvar' 2013 (http:// www.dynacon.ru/content/articles/975/).
 Kiva A.V. (2014) Modeli kitajskikh i rossijskikh reform: v chem korennoe otlichie // Obsche- stvennye nauki i sovremennost', № 6, s. 83–93.
 Kordonskij S. (2000) Rynki vlasti: administrativnye rynki SSSR i Rossii. M.: OGI.
 Kuznetsova S. (2010) V ocheredi nakhodilos' okolo 8 tys. chelovek // Kommersant'-Vlast', № 28, 19 iyulya 2010, s. 56–62.
 Pliskevich N.M. (2014). Modernizatsiya v Rossii i Kitae: startovye usloviya i spetsifika gosudarstva. // Obschestvennye nauki i sovremennost'. № 6, s. 94–101.
 Strategiya-2020 (2012) Itogovyj doklad o rezul'tatakh ehkspertnoj raboty po aktual'- nym problemam sotsial'no-ehkonomicheskoj strategii Rossii na period do 2020 goda “Stra- tegiya-2020: Novaya model' rosta – novaya sotsial'naya politika”. VShEh i RANKhiGS, mart 2012 (http://2020strategy.ru/data/2012/03/14/1214585998/1itog.pdf).
 Yakovlev A. (2012) Sistema goszakupok v Rossii: na poroge tret'ej reformy // Obschestven- nye nauki sovremennost', № 5, s. 54–70.
 Baumol W.J. (1990) Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive // Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, no. 5, pp. 893–921.
 Berliner J.S. (1957) Factory and manager in the USSR. Harvard University Press.
 7 Naskol'ko mozhno sudit', podobnye protsessy otchasti uzhe idut v ramkakh Dal'nevostochnogo fede- ral'nogo okruga, blagodarya aktivnosti ministra po razvitiyu Dal'nego Vostoka A. Galushki, kotoryj pri ehtom tesno vzaimodejstvuet s polpredom prezidenta i vitse-prem'erom Yu. Trutnevym.
 Berliner J. (1952) The Informal Organization of the Soviet Firm // The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 342–365.
 Blanchard O., Shleifer A. (2001) Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia // IMF Staff Papers, vol. 48, Transition Economies: How Much Progress? pp. 171– 179.
 Chandler A. (1962) Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise. The MIT Press. Cambridge (Mass.).
 Fan J.P.H., Jun Huang, Morck R., Yeung B. (2009) The Visible Hand behind China’s Growth.
 Paper prepared for the Joint NBER-CUHK Conference on Capitalizing China. December 2009.
 Jin H., Qian Y., Weingast B.R. (2005) Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese style // Journal of Public Economics, vol. 89, no. 9, pp. 1719–1742.
 Johnson S., Kaufman D., Shleifer A. (1997) The Unoffi cial Economy in Transition // Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 2, pp. 159–239.
 Lane D. (2008) From Chaotic to State-led Capitalism // New Political Economy, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 177–184.
 Kolodko G.W. (2000) From Shock to Therapy: the Political Economy of Post-socialist Transformation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 Kornai J. (1980), Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
 Ledeneva A.V. (1998) Russia’s Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange.
 Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Li Hongbin, Zhou Li-An (2005) Political Turnover and Economic Performance: the Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China // Journal of Public Economics, vol. 89, pp.1743–1762.
 Malle S. (2013) Economic Modernisation and Diversific ation in Russia. Constraints and Challenges. // Journal of Eurasian Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 78–99.
 Markevich A., Zhuravskaya E. (2011) M-form Hierarchy With Poorly-diversifi ed Divisions: a Case of Khrushchev’s Reform in Soviet Russia // Journal of Public Economics, vol. 95, issues 11–12, December 2011, pp. 1550–1560.
 Maskin E., Qian Yingyi, Xu Chenggang (2000) Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form // The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 359–378.
 North D., Wallis J.J., Weingast B.R. (2009) Violence and Social Orders: a Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
 North D., Wallis J.J., Webb S., Weingast B.R. (eds) (2013) In The Shadow of Violence: the Problem of Development in Limited Access Societies. New York: Cambridge University Press.
 Popov V. (2014). Mixed Fortunes: an Economic History of China, Russia and the West. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 Qian Yingi (1999) The Process of China’s Market Transition (1978–1998): Evolutionary, Historical and Institutional Perspectives. Paper prepared for the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics symposium on Big-Bang Transformation of Economic Systems as a Challenge to New Institutional Economics, June 9–11, 1999, Wallerfangen/Saar (Germany).
 Qian Yingyi, Roland G., Xu Chenggang (2006) Coordination and Experimentation in M-Form and U-Form Organizations // Journal of Political Economy, vol. 114, no. 2, pp. 366–402.
 Qian Yingyi, Xu Chenggang (1993) The M-form Hierarchy and China’s Economic Reform // European Economic Review, vol. 37, no. 2–3, pp. 541–548.
 Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. (1993). Corruption // The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, no. 3, pp. 599–617.
 Slinko I.,Yakovlev E., Zhuravskaya E. (2005) Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia // American Law and Economics Review, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 284–318.

Comments

No posts found

Write a review
Translate